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Abstract
An increasing literature encourages the use of selective immigration policies as a tool
to promote incentives to education. It is argued that, since not everybody is allowed
to migrate, under these policies a poor country may well turn out with more human
capital than in autarchy. The implicit assumption is that migrations are permanent.
However, this assumption has recently been dropped: a large literature studies the
optimal migration duration in an intertemporal framework. In our work we study
how selective immigration policies aect the human capital accumulation and the
migration duration. Unlike most of the existing literature, the probability of entering
abroad is endogenous and our analisys is not limited to two periods: there is no
reason to consider a single migration spell, and our innite-horizon model includes
an aggregate shock as a source of constrained migration. Contrary to the "brain gain
with a brain drain" reasoning, we show that selective policies may be harmful for
human capital accumulation. As a consequence, their eectiveness is questionable,
and they may produce a "brain loss" rather than a brain gain. Besides, borders
closure backres on migration duration especially for unskilled workers.
Keywords: return migration, human capital, brain drain.
JEL Classication: F 200, F220.
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1 Introduction
The role of international migrations in international factor movements has always
been peculiar: unlike  ows of capital or goods, in ows of immigrants can generate
frictions with natives and xenophobia, particularly when combined to high unemploy-
ment.
The eastward enlargement of the European Union is going to add approximately
50 millions of people to the existing labor force. Large and persistent wage dientials
support the incentives for extensive mass migration from low-wage, densely populated
countries, to the developed world. This is the case of the Latin America with respect
to the U.S., and of North Africa with respect to the E.U. (Lundborg and Segerstrom
2002). Concerns about the eects of mass immigration push the governments of
destination countries to raise entry barriers, and the governments of source countries
to be concerned about the risk of a brain drain. OECD (1999) reports that in the
years 1997-98 many countries have modied their entry regulations, essentially ”to
reinforce borders control and restrict the requirements of entry, residence and work”.
OECD (2001) conrms this legislative trend.
Entry barriers based on human capital requirements have an important eect on
the migrants’ behaviour, and they are renewing the brain drain concerns1. Some
recent contributions, however, (Mountford, 1997; Stark and Wang, 2002) argue that,
as long as there exist a severe immigration restriction, source countries may benet
as well from the incentive to migrate, because eventually most human capital is
retained within the homeland. However, as it is well-known in the literature, what
really matters for a brain drain to exist is that the emigration decision is permanent.
Most of the early economic analyses of migrations rely on wage dierentials in a
static context (Sjaastadt 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970). In these models, migration
towards the rich countries increases with wage dierentials. Within such a framework,
the decision to migrate can only be permanent and voluntary. Both these assumptions
are at odds with reality, the rst because there are both in ows and out ows of
migrants, and the second because migration waves are also driven by aggregate shocks,
like wars, macroeconomic crises, climate changes.
Temporary migration is receiving an ever-increasing attention in the literature.
1For a recent survey about the brain drain literature we refer to Commander et al. (2003).
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Dustmann (2001) points out that ”temporary migrations are not uncommon, and
often they are the rule rather than the exception”, even in spite of persistent higher
wages in the destination country2. OECD (1999, 2001) dedicates as well particular
attention to this subject. As for the importance of aggregate shocks, OECD (2001)
emphasizes the role of the recent regional con icts multiplication in increasing the
migratory  ows. It is well-known that the emigration wave from Europe in the 1840s
was associated with famine and revolutions. Bonifazi and Strozza (2001) describe
the huge population relocation occurred in the decade following World War II. More
recently, Africa civil wars typically displaced 64 per thousand of the population per
year. In 1975, the fall of Saigon produced a large scale exodus from Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia, and, twenty years later, the disintegration of Yugoslavia generated
large  ows to the E.U. (Chiswick and Hatton 2002).
A satisfactory model should deal with the possibility of forced emigration. More-
over, once selective policies are established, the migration duration and human capital
accumulation decisions can’t be considered separately. Unlike most of the existing
literature, we are able to account for both voluntary and constrained migration: wage
dierentials cause the former and aggregate shocks cause the latter. The importance
of these factors for studying migration from poor to rich countries is self-evident.
In our model a country-specic shock aecting the source country can generate a
migration wave.
To give an idea of the macroeconomic risk associated to several developing coun-
tries, in Table 1 we reproduce a table from ”The Economist” (may 27th 2004). "The
rankings combine measures of political risk (such as the threat of war) and economic
risk (such as the size of scal decits). They also include measures that aect a coun-
try’s liquidity and solvency (eg, its debt structure and foreign-exchange reserves)".
Similar indicators are widely used in the business community and in the academic
literature (Beine et al., 2003; Easterly and Levine, 1997).
Another common assumption in the literature on return migration is that the
return decision is permanent3. From a theoretical perspective, it is not evident why
migration should be limited to a single spell. There exists, indeed, clear evidence that
2We refer to Dustmann (2001) for further references about temporary migrations.
3 See for example Galor and Stark (1990), and Dustmann (1997). See Hill (1987) for a model of
multiple migrations.
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Figure 1: Table 1
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even at the end of the XIX century repeated migration spells of 3-4 years were not
uncommon (Baines 1991)4. According to Chiswick and Hatton (2002), over the same
period the out ow of returning migrants from the U.S. grew from less than 10% up
to 30% of the in ow. In more recent times, similar results are reported by Byerlee
(1974) for African migrants, and by Cornelius (1978) and North and Houstoun (1976)
for Mexican ones.
In this paper we try to overcome this restriction, and we are able to study the
migratory behaviour and the human capital accumulation when migration can be
both voluntary and constrained, in presence of selective policies for the access to the
destination country. To this aim, we develop an innite horizon model where an indi-
vidual determines jointly her migration duration and her human capital. Our ndings
conrm the importance of migration prospects as an incentive to human capital ac-
cumulation (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1997; Stark and Wang 2002). Under more
general assumptions, however, it turns out that restrictive immigration policies may
hinder human capital accumulation. This happens because entry restrictions reduce
expected returns to human capital, and, under certain circumstances, they cause a
"brain loss". The reasoning behind the "brain gain with a brain drain" is therefore
not always valid.
We stress that a brain drain arises when migration is permanent. Talented indi-
viduals can often choose their location according to their preferences: as long as the
preference for home consumption is not outweighted by macroeconomic risk, migra-
tions are temporary. As a consequence, promoting political and economic stability of
the sending countries may be more eective than entry barriers.
Besides, our results question the consistency of restrictive immigration policies
with the objective of reducing the immigrants’ stock: especially for low-skilled work-
ers, entry closure biases the incentive structure towards longer migration spells and,
eventually, permanent migration. Faini (1996) points it out clearly: ”If a migrant
is not certain that he would be allowed back in the host country if he ever returned
4”One reason for thinking that the emigrants intended to remain abroad for only a relatively
short period is that many made a second emigration just after returning. For example, ten per cent
of the Italian immigrants into the U. S. in 1904 were entering for the second time” (Baines, 1991,
p. 36); and ”As transport improved, emigration became less nal. [...] The changes also favoured
a relatively new kind of emigrant -one who expected to return within a relatively short period”
(Baines, 1991, p. 41)
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home, his propensity to return will obviously decline”.
The paper is organised as follows: next Subsection reviews some main ndings in
the literature. Our model is developed in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4 we discuss
our results, and a sensitivity analysis is used to illustrate our ndings in Section
5. Section 6 contains a comparison of our results to those present in the literature.
Conclusions are reported in Section 7. The proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
The possible benets of a brain drain and the focus on return migration are recent
topics in the literature. In an OLG framework there are several mechanisms able to
generate some benets from the brain drain, and they rely basically on the existence of
externalities on the human capital: Vidal (1998) points to enhanced intergenerational
transmission of skills and education; Mountford (1997) and Beine et al. (2001) stress
the possibility of intergenerational spillovers between skilled workers.
The possibility of migration increases the expected returns to human capital, and
thus the incentive to education. Stark et al. (1997) distinguish between education
and ability. When there exists asymmetric information about the worker’s ability,
the incentive to invest in education and migrating is even stronger for low-ability in-
dividuals; however, after their real productivity is observed, they will nd convenient
to return. Stark and Wang (2002) use a static model to state some conditions under
which a restrictive immigration policy in the destination country increases the welfare
of the sending country: the idea is that entry rationing in the developed countries
can keep most of the human capital at home.
The literature about return migration adopts mainly life-cycle models.
An early contribution to the study of migration duration it given by Djajic and
Milbourne (1988). They develop a two-period model to study the eect of wage
dierentials in determining migration  ows and their nal eect on the equilibrium
wages, but they are aware that more research is needed to understand why ”some
migrants make several trips, some stay longer than others, and some never return”.
Hill (1987) stresses, interestingly, the importance of ”the repetitive character of
contemporary labor migration”; in spite of that, his assumption of an identical dura-
tion for each migration spell can be deceptive.
Dustmann (2001) shows that an increase in the host country wage may lead both
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to a decrease and an increase in migration duration.
Dustmann (1997) develops a life-cycle model to study the eect of the correlation
between the shocks in the host and the origin labour markets. Both the optimal
migration duration and migrants’ saving behaviour depend heavily on the sign of this
correlation; nonetheless, the nal result is undetermined because it depends on both
the wage dierential and on the relative risk in the two labour markets.
Mesnard (2004) considers temporary migration as a possible way to overcome
rationing in the credit market.
Galor and Stark (1990) suggest that an exogenous probability of returning may
induce migrants to work harder and save more than natives to smooth their consump-
tion path.
2 Migration in innite horizon
The life-cycle model is the basis of the literature surveyed in the previous Section.
However, the use of only two periods tends to hide ”the repetitive character of contem-
porary labor migration” (Hill, 1987), and this is why the return decision is generally
considered as permanent. In this Section, we shall try to overcome this restriction.
When we shift to innite horizon, it appears immediately that considering only one
stay abroad is somewhat arbitrary. In our model migrations are a recurrent phe-
nomenon, driven by wage dierentials and by aggregate shocks.
For simplicity, we consider a risk-neutral potential migrant with an innite life
horizon. She must rst choose whether or not to migrate to a destination country G>
and then after how much time to return to her origin country R.
In both countries there exists a unique consumption good produced using only
capital by means of a linear technology:
fwl = nwl l = R>G w = 0> 1> 2====
For simplicity, country O is not endowed with capital, that is accumulated in D
by means of inelastically supplied labor.
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2.1 Destination country
The law regulating capital accumulation in D is
nw+1 = (1 ) nw + (1 + k) (1)
where 0 ?  ? 1 is the depreciation rate and (1 + k) A 0 and nite is the per-period
inelastic supply of ”eort”: it is given by the sum of a basic eort (1) delivered by
any individual irrespective of her skill plus her human capital endowment (k  0).
In other words, capital accumulation is faster for skilled individuals= This re ects
dierences in productivity among agents with dierent human capital endowment
(k). The per-period utility in G is
xG
¡
fGw
¢
= fGw
2.2 Origin country
To keep our model as simple as possible, in R there is neither capital endowment
(n0 = 0) nor capital production, thus migration is needed in order to accumulate
(in principle, we could allow for a more realistic slower capital accumulation without
changing our results).
To stress the importance of macroeconomic risk in developing countries we assume
that in each period the accumulated capital is conscated with a probability 0 ? s ?
1, whereas with a probability (1  s) it is perfectly conserved. Such an assumption
requires some words of explanation: our aim is to account for both economic migration
and constrained migration. While most of the literature is focused on the latter, we
are including in our model a push factor able to generate a constrained migration
wave. Such shocks can be currency crisis, hyperin ations, wars, coups d’état, and they
are typical of developing countries. In each of these cases, most of the accumulated
wealth of the population can be destroyed 5. After a capital conscation, an individual
is forced to re-migrate.
5Consider that temporary migration is often used to build homes or to start a business (See Dust-
mann and Kirchkamp 2002, Mesnard 2004 and the references quoted therein). Wealth conscation
may occur in case of dictatorship or under a bank rush: more generally, it can be associated with
political regime changes.
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Therefore, the capital stock in R is
nw+1 = (1 s) nw (2)
In spite of poor economic conditions, in R it is possible to accumulate human
capital, as it is often the case for developing countries. An individual can accumulate
her human capital by means of her eort h:
h = h (k) (3)
h0 (k) A 0
h00 (k) A 0
h (0) = 0
Individuals dier with respect to their abilities:
hl = lh (k)
l A 0
l  i ()
A key assumption of the literature about return migration is that the marginal
utility of home consumption is higher:
xR
¡
fRw
¢
= fRw >  A 1=
where fRw is consumption in O and  is a coe!cient used to depict the preference for
home consumption. As a consequence, consumption in R dominates consumption in
G, but in G it is possible to accumulate capital (n).
Conscation of the capital stock is ruled out inG, where the economic and political
environment is comparatively highly stable.
Given the linear technology used to produce the consumption good, consumption
in R is equal to the endowment of capital, if the shock is not realized, or to zero, in
the opposite case.
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3 Migration duration and human capital accumulation
Now we turn to the individual optimization problem: we assume that the physical
capital endowment in w = 0 is zero, thus consumption, and therefore the utility is
nil. To make things clearer, it is useful to begin assuming no entry rationing in G.
The migrant has to choose the optimal time to spend in G, and her optimal human
capital level. We denote with UP0 (k> W ) the utility corresponding to W periods of
migration with zero initial physical capital endowment:
XP0 (k> W ) = Y G (k> W ) + WY R (k> nW ) (4)
where 0 ?  ? 1 is the discount factor, Y G (W ) is the utility of staying W periods
abroad and Y R (nW ) is the utility of returning to R with the accumulated capital nW =
The eort required to acquire human capital (lh(k)) enters negatively the utility.
However, as we have stressed in the Introduction, migrating is not the result of a
purely individual choice: there exist several institutional barriers rationing entry into
foreign countries. Human capital endowment is a crucial variable enabling a migrant
to enter D6. Usually highly skilled individuals have better opportunities of mobility,
whereas restrictive immigration policies are targeted to less qualied or unskilled
individuals. As a result of these restrictions, only a fraction of migrants are allowed
to cross the border.
In our model the probability t of enteringG is a function of individual and institu-
tional characteristics. Human capital-based screening gives everybody a probability
of entering  (k) > while the parameter [ 5 [0> 1] depicts the weight that immigration
policy places on human capital: with [ close to 1, immigrants are screened according
to the human capital they bring into the country7. When [ is close to 0, entry is
free for anybody. This is a convenient way to represent the complex combination of
individual and institutional characteristics enabling an individual to cross the border.
The overall probability t((k)>[) of entering G is therefore given by
6Regulations dier among dierent countries, but, generally, entry requirements are homogeneous
and stable over time for large areas. For example, we may think of the EU as a single macro-region,
as well as the US.
7For example, Canada uses a point scheme since 1965; Australia has adopted a similar policy
-recently rened- since 1984, and so does the UK.
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t((k)>[) = [ (k) + (1[) (5)
(k) has the following properties:
0 (k) A 0 and bounded
 (K) = 1 (6)
0 (K) = 0 (7)
 (0) = 0 A 0
Quite intuitively,  (k) is increasing in h.  (K) = 1 means that the government
establishes a threshold level of human capital (K) which entitles to free mobility8.
(0) = 0 A 0 is the probability of entering as a totally unskilled worker (it may well
be the probability of entering illegally).
When entry is made uncertain, the utility of migrating is
XP0 (k> W ) = Y G (W ) + W
©
(1 s)Y R (nW ) + stXP0 (k> W ) + s (1 t)Y R (0)
ª
(8)
Which is to be interpreted as follows: The agent returns home after W periods abroad,
which give her an utility Y G (W ). Once returned, her capital is conserved with a
probability (1 s), yielding a utility Y R (nW ) =Conversely, her capital is conscated
with a probability s, and she will immediately try to re-migrate. With a probability
t she will succeed and re-build her capital stock getting a utility XP0 (k> W ). With a
probability (1 t) she won’t succeed, and she will simply get the utility of living in
R without capital (Y R (0))9.
The lifetime utility X(k> W ) is given by the utility of migrating minus the disutility
of the eort:
X(k> W ) = XP0 (k> W ) lh(k) (9)
8Obviously, when k  K , 0 (K) = 0 because any unit of human capital beyond the threshold
cannot increase further the probability of entering D. Notice, however, that there may exist an
incentive to accumulate more human than K because it still aects the accumulation of physical
capital n= Finally, a government may desire not to give free entry to anybody. In such a case,
K A4=
9The procedure to compute XP0 (W ) is shown in the Appendix.
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substituting (8) into (9) we nally get
X (k> W ) = Y G (W ) + W
©
(1 s)Y R (nW ) + stXP0 (k> W ) + s (1 t)Y R (0)
ª
 lh(k)
(10)
Given the simple structure of the model, Y G (W ) is the indirect utility of the
following maximization problem:
Y G (W ) = max
W31X
w=0
W fw (11)
subject to the constraints
fw = nw
nw+1 = (1 ) nw + (1 + k)
n0 = 0=
Y R (nW ) is simply the utility of living in R with an initial capital endowment nW .
Constructing the expressions for Y G (W ) and Y R (nW ) (see the Appendix) gives
the expected lifetime utility associated to W periods of migration:
X(k> W ) =
(k+1)

h
13W31
13  (1 )
³
13((13))W31
13((13))
´i
+ (k+1)

W31(13s)(13(13)W )
13(13s)
¸
1 s
W t((k)>[)
[13(13s)][13(13t((k)>[))]
lh(k)
(12)
The emigrant has to maximize (12) with respect to W and k= This two-variable
optimization program does not admit a closed-form solution. However, it is possible
to show its characteristics, and derive the su!cient conditions for the existence of a
solution (W W, kW) where W W is nite and kW  0.
Proposition 1 (Optimal migration duration under uncertainty) A su!cient condi-
tion to have an interior solution to the maximization program is that  A 1= The
value of 1 is shown in the Appendix. When this condition hold, the optimal migration
duration is positive and nite for any kW  0=
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, the above Proposition states that for having an interior solution we
need a su!ciently high preference for home consumption. Notice that we are reporting
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a su!cient condition. This means that a nite migration exists under quite general
conditions and that the incentive to accumulate abroad and return exists for unskilled
workers as well (kW  0).
It is interesting to remark that this result reverses the ”common wisdom”: as long
as  is su!ciently high, permanent migration is somewhat more di!cult to explain
than temporary migration.
In Figure 3.1, we show a plot of (12)10.
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4 Brain gain or brain loss?
A new immigration policy is a change in [= Generally, a government may aect 0
and the shape of (k) as well; however, varying [ is the most direct intervention
to make entry rationing more -or less- severe11. We are now going to examine the
impact of [ on W W and kW= By means of the implicit function theorem it is easy to
10The plot is obtained with the following functional forms: h(k) = k2; t(k>) = 1   +¡
1 hk
¢
; the parameters are:  = 4;  = =8;  = =03;  = =5; s = =25;
 = 20=
11It is useful to recall that  = 1 indicates that entry is totally screening-based.
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show (see the Appendix) that the sign of Ck
W
C[ is equal to the sign of
C
C[
μ
CX(W> k)
Ck
¶
(13)
Studying the properties of (13) enables us to write the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 (Brain Gain and Brain Loss) When l is su!ciently large and Ct((k)>[)Ck
is su!ciently small, selective immigration policies are harmful to human capital ac-
cumulation.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that the argument for "a brain gain with a brain drain" can
easily be reversed, because it depends on the sign of Ck
W
C[ .
Notice that the "brain loss" of our model diers from the "brain drain", which
stems from permanent migration. The brain loss occurs because expected returns to
human capital are reduced when entering D is made di!cult.
In the Appendix, we show that, when the probability of admission is little sensi-
tive to an increase in k> agents with l large enough reduce their equilibrium human
capital. Moreover, the reduction is most important for the most disadvantaged indi-
viduals.
Since agents with the "wrong" sign of Ck
W
C[ reduce their education, the case for
"a brain gain with a brain drain" argued, for example, by Stark and Wang (2002)
is not general: selective immigration policies may be an incentive to human capital
accumulation as well as a disincentive, and their use should be carefully evaluated12.
Generalizing the reasoning behind the "brain gain with a brain drain" implies
that a migrant has no chance whatsoever to enter D without human capital or that
it is only useful to cross the border. Otherwise, wage dierentials supply the "right"
incentives by themselves.
It is important to stress that our agents are risk-neutral: risk aversion would
produce even stronger results; moreover, the denominator of (12) is minimum for
[ = 0> thus, in terms of individual utility, free entry always dominates entry rationing.
12It is important to mention the result in Mountford (1997): he clearly shows that the equilibrium
human capital is increasing with the probability of migrating. Nonetheless, in his model, he can’t
provide for free migration without causing a complete human capital depletion in the source country.
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Finally, we can get an important insight from our model: if we interpret l as a
country-specic parameter rather than an individual charachteristic, we can apply the
above reasoning on a country scale: a brain loss may damage the economies turned
up with Ck
W
C[ ? 0.
Remark 3 Since the sign of Ck
W
C[ may be dierent for dierent agents, applying a
uniform policy towards dierent individuals or countries can increase the world human
capital dispersion.
This nding casts some doubts on the eects the widespread adoption of point
schemes may have in the long run: such policies may benet the receiving countries,
but they are not a panacea and there exists a possibility that they exacerbate in-
equality. Beine et al. (2003) report evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the
possibility of migrating is a powerful incentive to acquire human capital. Indeed, in
their estimates the probability of migrating is substituted to wage dierentials. This
incentive eect, evidently, does not depend on the selective policies, but simply on
wage dierentials.
5 Numerical examples
5.1 Optimal migration duration
Since it is not possible to use the implicit function theorem to evaluate the eect of
[ and s on W W, we have to use a series of simulations.
The model has been simulated for dierent parameter values and dierent func-
tional forms of h(k) and (k)13. When searching the eect of [ over W W, we have
computed W W when [ ranges from 0 to 1, in steps of 0.01. We found that W W tends
to increase with [ especially for individuals with low human capital. This is quite
intuitive: skilled workers can easily recover abroad when the shock occurs, whereas
unskilled ones cannot, thus they stay abroad longer. Figure 5.1 below gives an ex-
ample with l = 5 (lower curve), l = 10 (middle curve) l = 20 (upper curve)14:
13Our simulations are available upon request.
14The parameters used are:
 = 4>  = =8;  = =03; s = =25>  = =5= h(k) = k2> t = (1 hk) + (1)
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Not surprisingly, the eect of s on the optimal migration duration is even more
important. In Figure 5.2 we have plotted W W against s ranging from 0 to .415 for two
individuals ( = 10>  = 20). Notice that in the upper [ = 1> and in the lower curve
[ = 0= Again, the selective policy biases the result towards a longer migration spell
especially for the less skilled worker=
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Figure 5.2: risk and migration duration.
In Fig. 5.3 we show an example of permanent migration. Such a result can be
obtained easily setting  close to one16=
15In these simulations, when s A =4 W  tends to innity. The values used are  = 4;  = =8;
 = =03;  = 20. t = (1 hk) + (1); h(k) = k2.
16We have set  = 1=2 in the previous simulations.
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Figure 5.3: permanent migration
As  re ects the importance of cultural and ethnic factors, one may think that it
is close to one when R and G are homogeneous in language, culture and traditions.
This implies that the incentive to return is more important the more dierent are R
and G. In other words, migrants who experience a more di!cult assimilation are the
most likely to return17.
Finally, in Figure 5.4 we show a plot of W W against 18 The upper curve is obtained
with [ = 1> and the lower curve with [ = =5=We have used [ = =5 instead of [ = =0
because in the latter case the eect is too small to be plotted on the same diagram.
Again, the line corresponding to the higher [ = 1 lies above the one corresponding
to the lower one.
Summarizing, our simulations show a trade-o between entry rationing and mi-
gration duration: frontier closure tends to increase time spent abroad and reduces
total utility. This is particularly true for unskilled migrants, i.e. those with low val-
ues of kW : since they can’t react to a restrictive policy by increasing their human
capital, they simply stay longer. This can be seen as a simple result of the Lucas cri-
tique. Nonetheless, closed-door policies are especially intended to reduce the number
17For an enlightening analysis of the assimilation problem, see the seminal Lazear’s (1999) article.
18The values used are:  = 2;  = =7;  = =1; s = =1; h(k) = k2; t = (1 hk) + (1)
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of unskilled immigrants, who are considered a burden for the welfare system.
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Figure 5.4: abilities and migration duration
5.2 Risk and optimal human capital accumulation
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, it is easy to see that the sign of the derivative
CkW
Cs is the sign of
C
Cs
μ
CX(W> k)
Ck
¶
=
In principle, this sign is ambigous: while risk makes less attractive to invest in human
capital, at the same time a skilled migrant can recover abroad easier. From this point
of view, human capital has an insurance eect. Which eect prevails is in principle
undetermined. Nonetheless, our simulations suggest that the nal impact on kW is
negative for realistic parameter congurations. This nding, however, should not be
generalized. We give an example in gure 5.5.19, where, in both diagrams, the upper
curve is obtained with [ = 0, and the lower one with [ = 1.
19The parameter values are  = 4>  = =85>  = =05> h(k) = k2> t = (1  exp(k)) + 1  =
Other simulations used, for example, h(k) = Hk> h(k) = k2 + k=
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Figure 5.5: macroeconomic risk and equilibrium human capital.
Again, the comparison between closed-door and open-door policies shows that a
pure selective policy can be a disincentive to human capital accumulation. This is
not surprising, since the denominator of (12) is minimum for [ = 0> thus utility is
higher for any (k> W ) when [ = 0=
Diagrams in Figure 5.5 have been plotted for two individuals, with l = 20 and
l = 40 respectively. Even though both agents reduce kW when [ = 1> the eect is
more important when l = 40, i.e. for the most disadvantaged individual.
In the following Sections, we are going to discuss the consequences of a "brain
loss".
6 Brain drain Vs. brain gain
The contributions mentioned in Section 1.1 stress that migration is not necessarily a
cause of brain drain because the possibility of migrating establishes an incentive for
human capital accumulation and, as long as not everybody is allowed to migrate, the
origin country may end up with more human capital than in autarchy. Mountford
(1997), and Stark and Wang (2002) state some conditions under which a restrictive
immigration policy in the destination country enhances the origin country’s welfare.
Contrary to our work, in these articles migration is permanent, and the probability of
entering G is exogenous. Our work does not deal with the growth problem associated
to the brain drain; however, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the stock
of human capital in R.
First of all, we reproduce the well-known result that, as long as migration duration
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is nite, there is no brain drain. Moreover, in our setting total freedom of immigration
would not generate a brain drain per se.
From this point of view, the true causes of brain drain are the individual prefer-
ences and the country-specic risk, rather than wage dierentials. The most gifted
individuals are contended on the international markets, and often they can decide
their location according to their preferences: if   1 there is no reason to stay in R.
On the contrary, too high a risk of a negative shock may push an agent with  A 1
out of her country.
Unlike most of the current literature, in our paper the probability of entering
abroad is endogenous, and it depends on the amount of human capital. Moreover,
wage dierentials are proportional to the accumulated human capital, thus incentives
to education exist independently of selective immigration policies. In this case, ra-
tioning at the borders may reinforce the incentive to acquire human capital for some
individuals, but may destroy it for others. More precisely, immigration policy deter-
mines endogenously the share of individuals with kW = 0, whereas in Stark and Wang
(2002) it is simply assumed that not all workers can build su!cient human capital to
have a positive probability of entry. While supporters of selective policies move from
the unlikely assumption that there is no chance to cross the border without human
capital, we argue that the correct benchmark should be free immigration.
Since restrictive immigration policies can deter some individuals to take any ed-
ucation, their use should be careful: under some not unlikely circustances, they can
generate more inequality in the human capital distribution.
Finally, let us recall that, if we consider  as a country-specic coe!cient, adopting
the same policy towards dierent countries may have undesired eects.
7 Conclusions
Ten years ago, Crettez, Michel and Vidal (1996) claimed that "policies aimed at
promoting or regulating inter-country migration  ows are often made without any
underlying conceptual framework". Nowadays, the study of migration duration is
receiving increasing attention, as well as the eect of migration prospects on human
capital accumulation. In our work, we have attempted to connect these streams of
literature.
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We think that we have carefully modelled this major point of our paper: we have
generalised the choice about migration duration to an innite-horizon framework,
at the cost of using a rough carachterization of the consumption behaviour. This
has proved necessary to preserve simplicity and analytic tractability. Our ndings
question the eectiveness of human-capital based immigration policies. First, we con-
rm that migration duration is not independent of the immigration policy. Second,
macroeconomic risk may be even more important than wage dierentials when de-
ciding whether or not to return. Third, selective policies are a double-edged weapon:
they can both foster and harm the equilibrium level of human capital.
With respect to a laissez-faire policy they decrease returns to human capital,
and they can have ambigous eects on incentives to education. This might cause a
"brain loss", rather than a brain drain. At least, this result suggest that selective
immigration policies should not be used unconditionally, and that the logic behind
the "brain gain with a brain drain" is not always correct.
The empirical implications of this nding are quite important. Depending on the
interpretation of > when uniform selective policies are applied we should observe
more or less dispersion in human capital distribution within or between the origin
countries, according to the sign of Ck
W
C[ = We hope to develop our research in this way
in the future.
With respect to the optimal migration spell, we nd that closed-door policies
backre on migration duration especially for unskilled immigrants (kW = 0). Such
policies underestimate the importance of this eect. Kossoudji (1992), indeed, nds
that attempts to enforce the U.S.-Mexican border eventually "alter lengths of spells of
future trips to the U.S.". This outcome is well-known among demographers: Bonifazi
and Strozza (2001) consider the introduction of entry barriers in Germany after the
oil shocks. After 1975, in ow was reduced, but new entries occurred mainly through
family reunication20. Family reunication indicates that expectations about migra-
tion duration have changed: the costs of returning home may be too high to permit
an easy reversal21. Currently, family reunications account for at least one half of the
20See King (1993) for similar results. For further references on the eect of the post-oil shocks
frontier closure on family reunication we refer to Venturini (2001, p. 217-221 and the authors
quoted therein).
21Think, for example, to the children’s education.
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legal in ow into the E.U. (OECD; 2001, 2004). Only the migrants from the riskiest
countries are likely to stay forever anyway, and in this case entry restrictions are eec-
tive. Undoubtely, more empirical evidence is necessary on this topic; unfortunately, a
serious lack of data makes di!cult the research on migration duration: the available
databases track quite rarely the dierent trips of the same individuals.
Finally, in this paper,  (the preference for home consumption) is constant. In-
deed, it may well be time-dependent: we can imagine that, in the long run, an
assimilation eect may drive this paramenter towards 1, making consumption in ei-
ther country indierent. This would reinforce our concerns about the eectiveness of
entry restrictions.
On the other hand, economic policies can aect s : policies aimed to reduce the risk
in the developing countries reinforce by themselves the incentive to return. Though
it may be di!cult to in uence these processes, there are no theoretical reasons why
international, co-ordinated development policies should be less eective or more costly
than enforcing strict frontiers closure. It is also important to mention the literature
showing that trade liberalization can be the best option for an incentive-compatible
immigration reduction (Tre er, 1997).
23
References
Baines D.E., (1991). Emigration From Europe, 1815-1930. Macmillan, Bas-
ingstoke.
Beine M., Docquier F., Rapaport H., (2003)."Brain Drain and LDCs’ Growth:
Winners and Losers". IZA discussion paper 819.
Bonifazi C., Strozza S. (2002). "International Migration in Europe in the Last
Fifty Years", in: Bonifazi C., Cesano G., (Eds.), Contributions to International
Migration Studies. Istituto per le Ricerche sulla Popolazione, CNR, Monograe,
n. 12, 33-106 .
Byerlee D., (1974). "Rural-Urban Migration in Africa: Theory, Policy, and
Research Implications". International Migration Review 8, 543-566.
Chiswick B., Hatton T., (2002). "International Migration and the Integration
of Labor Markets". IZA discussion paper n. 559.
Commander S., Kangasniemi M., Winters L.A., (2004). "The Brain Drain:
Curse or Boon?" in "Challenges to Globalization", edited by R. Baldwin and
L.A. Winters L.A.University of Chicago press.
Cornelius W., (1978). Mexican Migration to the U.S.: Causes, Consequences
and U.S. Responses. Center for International Studies, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
Crettez B., Michel P., Vidal J.P., (1996). "Time Preference and Labour Mi-
gration in an OLG Model with Land and Capital". Journal of Population Eco-
nomics, vol. 9, 387-403.
Djajic S., Milbourne R., (1988). "AGeneral EquilibriumModel of Guest-Worker
Migration". Journal of International Economics vol. 25, 335-351.
Dustmann C., (1997). "Return Migration, Uncertainty and Precautionary Sav-
ings". Journal of Development Economics vol. 52, 295-316.
__________, (2001). "Return Migration, Wage Dierentials, and the Op-
timal Migration Duration". IZA Discussion Paper 264.
24
__________, Kirchkamp O., (2002). "The Optimal Migration Duration
and Activity Choice AfterRe-Migration". Journal of Development Economics
vol. 67, 351-372
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (1997): Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and
Ethnic Divisions, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 4: 1203-50.
Faini R., (1996). "Comment to Dustmann". Economic Policy vol. 22, 253-256.
Galor O., Stark O., (1991). "The Probability of Return Migration, Migrants’
Work Eort, and Migrants’ Performance". Journal of Development Economics
vol. 35, 399-405.
Harris J.R., Todaro M.P., (1970). "Migration, Unemployment and Develop-
ment: A Two-SectorAnalysis". American Economic Review vol. 70, 126-137.
Hill K.J., (1987). "Immigrant Decisions Concerning Duration of Stay and Mi-
gratory Frequency". Journal of Development Economics vol. 25, 221-234.
King R., (1993) (editor). Mass Migration in Europe. The Legacy and the Future.
Belhaven Press, London.
Kossoudji S.A., (1992). "Playing Cat and Mouse at the U.S.-Mexican Border".
Demography vol. 29 (2), 159-180.
Lazear E. P., (1999). "Culture and Language". Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 107/6, part II, S95-S126.
Lundborg P., Segerstrom P.S., (2002). "The Growth and Welfare Eects of
International Mass Migration". Journal of International Economics vol. 56, 177-
204.
Mesnard A., (2004). "Temporary Migration and Capital Market Imperfections".
Oxford Economic Papers vol. 56, 242-262.
Mountford A., (1997). "Can a Brain Drain be Good for Growth in the Source
economy?" Journal of Development Economics vol. 53 (2), 287-303.
25
North D.S., Houstoun M. T., (1976). The Characteristics and Role of Illegal
Aliens in the U.S.Labor Market: An Exploratory Study. Linton and Co., Wash-
ington DC.
OECD, (1999). Trends in International Migration. SOPEMI, Paris.
_____, (2001). Trends in International Migration. SOPEMI, Paris.
_____, (2004). Trends in International Migration. SOPEMI, Paris.
Sjaastad L.A., (1962). "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration". Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 70 (supplement), 80-93.
Stark O., Helmenstein C., Prskawetz A., (1997). "A Brain Gain with a Brain
Drain". Economics Letters vol. 55(2), 227-34.
Stark O., Wang Y., (2002). "Inducing Human Capital Formation: Migration as
a Substitute for Subsidies". Journal of Public Economics vol. 86(1), 29-46.
Tre er D., (1997). "Immigrants and Natives in General Equilibrium Trade Mod-
els", NBER working paper # 6209.
Venturini A., (2001). Le Migrazioni e i Paesi Sudeuropei, UTET Libreria, Turin,
Italy.
Vidal J.P.,(1998). "The Eect of Emigration on Human Capital Formation".
Journal of Population Economics, vol.11(4), 589-600.
26
Appendix
Derivation of Y G (W ): the optimization problem is
Y G (W ) = max
W31X
w=0
W fw (A.1)
subject to the constraints
fw = nw
nw+1 = (1 ) nw + (1 + k)
n0 = 0=
Integrating the law of motion of the capital, we get
Y G (W ) = (1 + k)
"
1 W
1  
1 ( (1 ))W
1 ( (1 ))
#
= (A.2)
Derivation of Y R (0):
Let us now rst compute Y R (0). In the current period consumption is zero, and
the agent is going to re-migrate in the following period with a probability t. If she
succeeds, her utility will be XP0 (k> W ), otherwise she will get again Y R (0) = Therefore,
we have
Y R (0) = 0 + 
©
tXP0 (k> W ) + (1 t)Y R (0)
ª
from which it is easy to get the expression for Y R (0) :
Y R (0) = tX
P
0 (k> W )
1  (1 t) = (A.10)
The computation of Y R (nW ) is less straightforward: the capital nW yields a utility
nW in the rst period. It is easy to compute
nW =
(1 + k)

³
1 (1 )W
´
(A.11)
In the following period, with a probability (1s) the adverse shock does not occur
and therefore the utility is still Y R (nW ). Conversely, the individual will re-migrate
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with a probability t or will get an utility equal to Y R (0) with a probability (1 t)=
We have then the following expression for Y R (nW ) :
Y R (nW ) = nW + 
©
(1 s)Y R (nW ) + stXP0 (k> W ) + s (1 t)Y R (0)
ª
(A.12)
Solving (A.12) with respect to Y R(nW ), and using (A.10) and (A.11), we immediately
get:
Y R (nW ) = 
(1 + k)

5
7
³
1 (1 )W
´
1  (1 s)
6
8+ stX
P
0 (k> W )
1  (1 s) +
+

s (1 t)
1  (1 s)
¸ 
tXP0 (k> W )
1  (1 t)
¸
= (A.13)
Now, substituting (A.10) and (A.12) in (9):
XP0 (k> W ) =
(1 + k)

"
1 W
1  
1 ( (1 ))W
1 ( (1 ))
#
+W

stXP0 (k> W ) +
s (1 t)tXP0 (k> W )
1  (1 t)
¸
+
+W
5
7
 (1 s)
³
1 (1 )W
´
1  +
stXP0 (k> W )
1  (1 s)
6
8+
+W
μ
s (1 t)
1  (1 s)
¶μ
tXP0 (k> W )
1  (1 t)
¶¸
(A.14)
rearranging the above expression we obtain the expression for (10).
It is useful to remark that X(0> 0) = 0 and that
lim
W3A"
X(k> W ) = (1 + k)

1
(1 ) 
1
1  (1 )
¸
 lh(k) (A.15)
Proof of Proposition 1)
Notice that the equilibrium human capital kW must always be nite: indeed, for
any kW A K the utility (12) is linear in k, while the eort lh(k) is convex. Thus,
beyond K, the marginal cost of accumulating human capital grows faster than the
marginal benet and the optimal k must be nite.
Now we have to prove that W W can be nite as well. Since (A.15) exists for any
nite value of k, we can write the dierence function (12) - (A.15):
GLII =
(k+1)

h
13W31
13  (1 )
³
13((13))W31
13((13))
´i
+ (k+1)

W31(13s)(13(13)W )
13(13s)
¸
1 s
W t((k)>[)
[13(13s)][13(13t((k)>[))]
lh(k)
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
½
(1 + k)


1
(1 ) 
1
1  (1 )
¸
 lh(k)
¾
(A.16)
a su!cient condition for a max of (12) with respect to (W> k) to exist is that (12)
approaches (A.15) from above for any non-negative k= This happens when (A.16) is
positive for any non-negative k in a neighborhood of W $4.
To study the sign of (A.16) around W $4 , remark rst that the terms depending
on W are W and (1 )W > which tend to zero as W goes to innity.
Thus, we can perform the following variable substitution in (A.16): W  e> and
(1 )W  g= We call this new function x(e> g)=
Let l be the coe!cient of the rst term of the Maclaurin expansion of x(e> g)=
The sign of x(e> g) for e$ 0 and g$ 0 is of course the same of (A.16) for W $4 ,
and it is given by the sign of l=
Finally, we can construct the following system of inequalities:
;
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA?
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
l A 0
0 ?  ? 1
0 ?   1
0  [  1
0 ?  ? 1
 A 1
0 ? s ? 1
h  0
k  0
 A 0
0 ? g ? (1 )
0 ? e  
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this system admits solutions for22
0 ?  ? 1
0 ?   1
0  [  1
0 ?  ? 1
 A 1
0 ? s ? 1
h A 0
k  0
 A 0
0 ? g ? 1
0 ? e ? 
where
1 =
1  (1 + s) (1 + ) [ (1 +  (k)) (1 + (1 + s)  (1 + ) + s )
(1 + g) (1 + s) (1 +  (1 + )) (1 + (1 +  (k)) [) +
+
g (1 + (1 + s) ) (1 +  ([  (k) [))
(1 + g) (1 + s) (1 +  (1 + )) (1 + (1 +  (k)) [)
1 is a function of k and W , because it contains  (k) and g.
To prove that there exist  A 1> we have to prove that 1 is bounded for any k
and any W  1= If 1 is continous and it is dened over a compact domain, we know
that it is bounded. Since g 5 [0> (1 )] for any W  1 and  (k) 5 [0> 1] for any k>
the rst requirement is satised23. Then we have to prove that 1 is continous.
To do so, we are going to study 1 along its boundaries: consider rst the case
when  (k)$ 0 :
lim 1
(k)<0
=
1  (1 + s) (1 + ) [ (1 + 0) (1 + (1 + s)  (1 + ) + s )
(1 + g) (1 + s) (1 +  (1 + )) (1 + (1 + 0) [)
+
22The routines written to solve the system are available upon request.
23Notice that we can set 0 = 0 without altering our results. Obviously when W = 0> 1 tends
to innity, but this case is not important since it yields zero utility.
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+
g (1 + (1 + s) ) (1 +  ([ 0[))
(1 + g) (1 + s) (1 +  (1 + )) (1 + (1 + 0) [)
this limit is bounded for any g  1> i.e. for any W 5 [1>4)=
lim 1
(k)<1
=
1 + g(1 +   s) +  (1 + s+   s)
(1 + g) (1 + s) (1 +  (1 + ))
this limit is nite for any g  1 as well. Now we have to study the boundaries for
g$ 0 and g$ (1 ) =
lim 1
g<0
=
1 +  (1 + s) (1 + ) + [ (1 +  (k)) (1 + (1 + s)  (1 + ) + s )
(1 + s) (1 +  (1 + )) (1 + (1 +  (k)) [)
On this boundary, 1 is bounded for any  (k) 5 [0> 1] = Finally, we have
lim 1
g<(13)
=
1 + (1 + s) (1 +  (k)) [
(1 + s) (1 +  (1 + )) (1 + (1 +  (k)) [)
which is dened for any  (k) 5 [0> 1] = Thus, 1 is continous on its boundaries. In
its interior the denominator is never zero, Since numerator and denominator of 1
cannot be contemporaneously 0, we conclude that 1 is continous. Thus there exists
a value P such that P A 1 for any pair  (k) 5 [0> 1] > g 5 [0> (1 )] =
Moreover
C1
C[ =
s(1 (k))
(1 + g) (1 + s) (1 + (1 + )) (1 + ( (k) 1)[)2
A 0=
Proof of Proposition 2)
To prove the Proposition, we only need to use the Implicit Function Theorem. To
simplify the notation, we indicate the utility in its maximumX(W W> kW) as X(W W([)> kW([)>[)>
and its partial derivatives withXlm l> m = k>[= Remark that, since W is discrete,
in a neighborhood of (kW)> W W does not change. The derivative CkWC[ is thus given
byCk
W
C[ = 
h
Xk[
Xkk
i
notice that the denominator of (Xk[Xkk ) is negative because Xkk is the second deriva-
tive of the utility in its max. Therefore, the sign of (Xk[Xkk ) in k
W is the sign of Xk[=
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The derivative Xk[ is
Xk[ = 
3
C
(| +p)
³

³
s 1+W (13(k)) (13[+[(k))
(13(13s)) (13 ([3[(k)))2
´
 s 
W (31+(k))
(13(13s)) (13 ([3[(k)))
´
{2
4
D

((1 + k) (| +p))
³
s (31+)W (313[+[(k))0(k)
(1+(31+s)) (13[+[(k))3
´
{2 +
+
2 ((1 + k) (| +p))
³
s2 (31+)2 2W [ (31+(k))0(k)
(1+(31+s))2 (13[+[(k))4
´
{3
where
{  1 s 
W (1[+[(k))
(1 (1 s) ) (1  ([[(k))) =>
| 

μ
1331+W
13 
(13( (13))31+W ) (13)
13 (13)
¶

and
p 
(1 s) W
³
1 (1 )W
´
(1 (1 s) ) 
We want to prove that this derivative can be negative in (W W> kW), where W W is
nite. To do so, it is su!cient to nd an example of a parameters set for which
CkW
C[ is always negative. We have performed several numerical simulations, and we
are going to report an example.
Set for instance  = =8;  = =05; [ = =7; s = =2= We substitute these values into
1 and multiply it by 5 to get  A 1=
After these substitutions, Xk[ is still a function of (k)> 0(k)> W> k=
Now, let
W  e (0 ? e  )
(1 )W  g (0 ? g  (1 ))
(k)   (0 ?   1)
0(k)  sk A 0=
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We can now solve the following inequality system:
Xk[ ? 0
0 ? e  =8
0 ? g  =95
0 ?   1
sk A 0
k  0
it is important to remark that the dependence on time is given by e and g= The system
has two sets of solutions, and we report for brevity the most interesting one:
0 ? e  =8
0 ? g  =95
0 ?   1
0 ? sk ? 11 3 + 14
2
39 + 14
0 ? k ? (  1) [25e (3 + 7) 18 (11 + 14)]sk [702 252 + 25e (17 + 7)]  1
Thus, in order, to have Ck
W
C[ ? 0 we need at the same time that both kW and 0(kW)
be su!ciently small. In other words, the optimal human capital has to be su!ciently
small, and the selective policy has to be "severe", in the sense that the marginal
increase in the probability of admission is small as k grows.
It is important to remark that:
1) this result is independent of W : it holds for any e and g, and thus for any W W;
2) it is always possible to nd 0 ? kW ? ((k
W)31)[25e(3+7(kW))318(11+14(kW))]
0(kW)[7023252(kW)+25e(317+7(kW))]  1
because the rst-order condition is linear in l> and we can solve it with respect to
l=Then, it is always possible to choose l such that as 0 ? kW ? ((k
W)31)[25e(3+7(kW))318(11+14(kW))]
0(kW)[7023252(kW)+25e(317+7(kW))] 
1= As a consequence, the condition on kW is indeed a condition on =
[[[l A 4> kW $ 0> and we can appropriately choice l to nd an
individual who meets the condition.]]]
The other set fo solutions allows for a less severe policy, but is not valid for any
W=
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In general, repeating the procedure with dierent values for > >[> s> gives two
sets of solutions with the properties discussed above: when the selective policy is
"severe", and that kW is low enough, the eect is negative for any W ; when the policy
is less severe we need that W W be su!ciently high.
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